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The 15-year-long resistance to Shell’s pipeline project in NW Ireland has become a strategic and 
symbolic site for resistance to neoliberalism and the petroleum industry, rooted in the 
combination of a community-based environmental justice struggle with the long-term 
involvement of a range of Irish social movements of the left and the intensive commitment of a 
substantial number of primarily international ecological activists. The movement faced the 
external challenges of extensive state violence and media demonisation of participants as well as 
the internal ones of divisions within the community, tensions between ecological and 
redistributive movement priorities and the instrumental attitude of some political parties and 
unions; despite this the campaign was very long by international standards, forced some 
substantial changes to state policy and has contributed to anti-austerity alliance formation and 
popular learning processes in the resistance to fracking, as well as to raising the political and 
financial cost of such projects massively. If it ultimately failed on its own terms, international 
comparison suggests that this had far more to do with the balance of forces against it than with 
internal difficulties. 
As against the assumption that social or ideological differences within a campaign are a source 
of inevitable doom (and the more banal assumption that unity is everything), this chapter 
explores the ways in which broad cohesion can be maintained despite such pressures. It 
highlights the internal learning processes of an initially conservative rural community over time; 
how the early imprisonment of 5 locals enabled the national left to support a campaign ‘led by 
the families’ rather than jockeying for leadership themselves; why the desertion of the campaign 
by parties in power did not lead to its collapse; and how Irish movements managed to educate 
international activists sufficiently that they and the community could work together effectively 
over time. It also questions simplistic notions of success and restates the importance of sustained 
popular mobilisation, learning through action and alliance formation as key elements of the 
potential needed to bring about a better world. The chapter frames this discussion in relation to 
Gramsci’s discussion of the formation of diverse kinds of subaltern knowledge and organisation 
and contemporary Marxist discussion of alliance-formation processes in social movements. 
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The chapter draws on discussions with activists in the campaign about their understandings and 
strategies in the process of resisting Shell, and seeks to draw out useful lessons for comparable 
campaigns elsewhere. 
A note on the complex, changeful nature of gas and oil ownership during this campaign: the 
Corrib gas field was discovered in 1996 by Enterprise Oil who continued as co-venturers on the 
Corrib project with Statoil and Marathon, until Royal Dutch Shell purchased their majority stake 
in 2002. Shell, Statoil and the Canadian group Vermilion, who bought out Marathon in 2009, 
continue as stakeholders, with Shell E&P as the operator and main shareholder on the project. 
The community led campaign understood early on the importance of selecting a clear target, 
given the corporate context of buyouts, merging and rebranding. In the wake of nationwide 
boycotting and picketing of Shell owned petrol stations, in solidarity with the community 
struggle, Shell was forced to sell its entire retail and commercial business in Ireland to Topaz.  
 
<1>What happened in Erris? 
In April 2000 an announcement in the parish newspaper informed residents of Erris that a new 
gas pipeline was proposed to run through the area to bring gas from the offshore Corrib field to a 
new refinery to be built at Bellanaboy. Erris is a strikingly beautiful, isolated and thinly 
populated part of Co. Mayo in northwest Ireland, surviving mostly on fishing, small-scale 
farming and tourism. A small number of villages, including Rossport and Pullathomas on 
opposite sides of Broadhaven Bay, were connected by quiet and narrow roads, which the state 
would soon upgrade for the benefit of the oil companies. Broadhaven Bay is protected as an EU 
Special Area of Conservation. Initial responses in Erris, like those in Mayo generally, were 
positive about the boost to local employment and the prospect of children being able to stay and 
find work locally. It took time for residents’ questions and doubts to clarify into a realisation that 
this was an experimental, high-pressure gas pipeline which, in case of an accident, would destroy 
many of the homes located close to the planned route. Consultation was limited, and the 2002 
decision by An Bord Pleanála (Irish Planning Board) to refuse planning permission for the 
project, was overridden in 2004 through the intervening influence of Taoiseach (Prime Minister) 
Bertie Ahern. Four years later, Ahern would be forced to resign after a corruption inquiry. 
Construction of the pipeline and refinery continued without consent from the community and 
without official permissions. 
Those interested in the area, including trade unionists who had worked on the Kinsale offshore 
gas field, noted that Ireland’s oil and gas regime had been changed in 1987 by energy minister 
Ray Burke, and again in 1992 by then-finance minister Bertie Ahern, from an approach inspired 
by Norway’s successful gas and oil industry, giving the state a 50% stake in any commercial find 
and applying a 50% corporation tax, to a regime which abolished any state participation in the 
development and a 100% tax write off. Burke, who made this decision while meeting alone with 
the oil companies against his civil servants’ advice, remains to this day the most senior minister 
in a notoriously corrupt polity to have done prison time (for tax fraud). 
Matters came to a head in the winter of 2005, when members of the local community refused to 
allow Shell access to their land for preparatory work on the pipeline. Rather unwisely, the 
company pursued proceedings for contempt with the result that five of those involved – three 
landowners and two figures in the community known to be influential in the emerging campaign, 
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all men, Shell choosing to ignore opposition from female landowners – were sent to Dublin’s 
Mountjoy prison indefinitely. Under Irish law they would have to remain there until they ‘purged 
their contempt’ and agreed not to interfere with the construction of the pipeline. This proved a 
double-edged sword for Shell, as those involved had no intention of doing so. 
The company had managed to create martyrs out of five people who looked and sounded like the 
western farmers and fishermen that for many symbolise the true spirit of Irishness. Even more 
damagingly, Mayo is an area where the Land War – a series of evictions, boycotts, mass 
meetings and other conflicts that led to a poor peasantry becoming landowning farmers and the 
end of the Anglo-Irish aristocracy – saw some of its sharpest conflicts (including that directed at 
Captain Boycott). Imprisoning such people for defending their land, on foot of legislation that 
granted compulsory purchase powers to private corporations for the first time, was not exactly a 
masterstroke. Mass mobilisations in the small town of Belmullet were followed by large scale 
marches in the capital city and at this stage the media were happy to run with the story. The 
‘Rossport Five’ had become national figures. After 94 days in prison, Shell dropped the 
injunction and the five were released in a victory for direct action. However, the community led 
campaign, learning from the experiences of the Munster based community campaign against 
Dow Chemical, understood the need to pursue a multipronged approach and continued to engage 
with official planning processes to redirect the project to sea. 
As often in Ireland, opposition parties – initially particularly Greens and Labour – as well as 
mainstream trade unions, offered verbal support. Green Party leaders held photo opportunities 
with local activists – and shortly afterwards took part in a government which used the military 
against the campaign. Laurence was present at a meeting with then-Labour Party President 
Michael D. Higgins who promised support for the campaign; once successful in being elected 
President of Ireland, nothing more was heard from him on the subject. A local parliamentary 
deputy and community GP, Gerry Crowley, elected on a ticket of defending local hospital 
services, sought to ensure the campaign followed his line of approach. Meanwhile, the 
community and campaign struggled to develop an understanding and approach which placed 
local people at the centre of decision-making as opposed to the traditional brokers who seek to 
lead and claim credit for most campaigns in Ireland. 
Solidarity came from Irish direct action campaigners, product of more than a decade of 
collaboration between radical ecologists and anarchist activism; from British and European 
activists of a similar bent; from student groups; from the unorthodox republicans of Éirigi; from 
some development, human rights and civil liberties organisations and individuals; from 
international opposition to the oil industry and Shell in particular; and from Norwegian trade 
unions critical of Statoil’s involvement. 
We have documented changing police and activist strategies elsewhere (Cox & Ni Dhorchaigh 
2011). For the purposes of this piece we can start by noting the damage done to Shell’s image, 
particularly in Norway where its partner Statoil was ultimately state-owned, by film of police 
breaking the community picket outside gates to the proposed refinery by baton-charging local 
protestors . This marked the beginning of an explicit ‘no-arrest’ strategy, observed and 
experienced by Hilary who was living at the solidarity camp during this period, whose practical 
implication was a large amount of intimidation (in an isolated rural community where numbers 
of tooled-up police and private security often outnumbered inhabitants, campaigners were 
followed by police, under daily surveillance by private security, their wives threatened with 
sexual violence, police cars parked outside their houses and so on), kettling, confiscation of 
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cameras, and off-screen violence (beatings, breakings of fingers, people thrown into ditches and 
onto barbed wire). At least one British undercover police officer is known to have infiltrated the 
community led campaign. 
As resistance became more intense and direct action more effective at blockading construction 
work, so too did repression. Private security, often recruited from far-right milieux in Eastern 
Europe, wore badges with skulls celebrating ‘battles’ against unarmed locals. A leading 
campaigner had his fishing boat boarded and scuttled by masked men; another was assaulted by 
masked men inside a Shell compound and hospitalised as a result. Frontline Defenders, Amnesty 
International and a UN Special Rapporteur carried out investigations highly critical of state and 
corporate violence and breaches of the law (Barrington, 2010); meanwhile, the relatively new 
police ombudsman found itself powerless to act on the hundreds of complaints of police 
violence. Repeated calls from government ministers, criminologists, lawyers and human rights 
NGOs for a public inquiry into the police operation, were ignored. In 2011, an accidental 
recording of police joking about raping and deporting protestors drew national attention; after 
over 700,000 viewings on Youtube it was eventually covered by national TV and a disgracefully 
bad investigation carried out, which targeted the activists concerned more than the police (Dublin 
Shell to Sea ND). 
The self-inflicted poor image of corporate and state behaviour forced the partial concession of a 
redrawn pipeline, further away from houses but still crossing a Special Area of Conservation and 
running under an area prone to landslides. Local concerns about the health and safety of the 
project were validated by repeated acts of negligence including one tragic incident in which an 
employee died during the underwater part of the construction. In 2016 the pipeline and refinery 
finally entered production. 
 
Assessment 
The campaign’s fifteen years of resistance to one of the world’s biggest oil companies, backed 
up by the full force of the state, marks out the ‘Rossport’ struggle as well beyond the ordinary. 
The wonder is not that the pipeline was built, but that resistance lasted so long: costs were more 
than quadrupled (from €800 million to 3.2 billion), massively raising the bar for any future 
developments of this nature. As an indirect effect, resistance to fracking in neighbouring regions 
marked notable successes, with an initial refusal from many local authorities being parlayed at a 
later point into legislation banning fracking in the Republic. Most recently, all opposition parties 
– including those otherwise supporting a minority government – supported a bill banning all 
offshore oil and gas exploration in Ireland. 
More broadly, the campaign transformed the way radical politics was done in Ireland. During the 
extended period of ‘social partnership’ up to the 2007-8 crash, the vast bulk of most movements 
remained willing to accept access to policy-makers and funding for service-delivery activities 
following state priorities in return for operating within institutional channels, accepting the broad 
framework of state policy and acting in isolation from other movements. Broad-based alliances 
against neo-liberalism and direct action forms of resistance were confined to the radical wings 
operating within the anti-capitalist ‘movement of movements’ (Cox 2006). Rossport saw the 
coming-together of this approach with community-based struggles and extensive popular 
learning in a decisive way, as the recession saw the state withdraw from partnership. The 
practices of grassroots solidarity politics advanced during the campaign would feed into a range 
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of campaigns including opposition to water charges (Cox 2017), abortion rights, housing, 
migrant and sex worker rights. 
Rossport continues as a reference point for a way of doing politics that doesn’t privilege the state 
or the party but instead places those most affected by the issue at the centre of decision making 
processes. It became a strategic and symbolic site for resistance to corporate and state power, 
shaped by an alliance between a community-based environmental justice struggle with the long-
term involvement of a range of Irish social movements of the left and the intensive commitment 
of a substantial number of primarily international ecological activists. 
All this was achieved by a tiny and disadvantaged rural community facing extensive economic 
pressure (corporate money given to local projects in return for political support; local politicians 
and business interests scenting benefits from the pipeline); extensive state violence, exhausting 
legal processes from planning appeals to criminal trials, and media demonisation of participants 
as directed by shadowy republican terrorists. Internally, family and local loyalties were often 
torn when personal connections had accepted corporate money or those hostile to the project 
disagreed on how to develop resistance (at times, as with the award-winning film The Pipe, in 
the glare of video cameras). Local community members disagreed with activists from national 
organisations, while Irish and English activists fell out . Those who did not object to gas 
extraction per se but had health and safety concerns or prioritised benefits to the local 
community, or the national tax take, disagreed with ecologists whose concern was to ‘keep it in 
the ground’. Political parties, both mainstream (Labour and Greens) and radical (Sinn Féin and 
Socialist Workers Party) adopted instrumentalising and at times manipulative attitudes, while 
trade unions also proved less than reliable allies at times. 
Success, then, is not about an absence of disagreement and divergence – normal in even 
relatively homogenous communities. It is about the ability to work together despite these. Given 
the inevitability of internal conflict for community led campaigns, we must ask ourselves, as 
grassroots and community-oriented activists, how can we help transform conflict into a 
productive force? The eventual building of the pipeline had far more to do with the balance of 
forces against the campaign than with internal difficulties. 
 
Structural factors 
Before moving to focus on the community education dimension of the campaign, we might ask 
how community-based campaigns can maintain broad cohesion despite these internal differences 
and external pressures. 
In the Irish context, the early and symbolic imprisonment of five local men was important in 
preventing other actors (local notables, mainstream parties or NGOs, urban radicals) from 
dominating the campaign. Following established traditions, it was agreed at the outset of their 
three-month imprisonment that decisions would have to be made by the families of those 
imprisoned, and this community-centric power remained after their release. The nature of the 
interests at play – the vast profits involved in oil and gas production and the state’s openness 
both to direct corruption and to wider ‘national interest’ concerns – removed most of the more 
opportunistic supporters who might have successfully placed themselves at the head of a 
campaign that threatened such interests less. 
6 
 
At the same time, the derisory consultation, ignoring of planning process and health and safety 
concerns, the scale of violence and intimidation and the hostility and downright lies from state 
and corporate media enabled a much faster learning process among locals who might otherwise 
have placed more faith in established institutions’ goodwill and the scope for easy resolution of 
the issues. The local community, and their radical supporters, thus had a clearer field for 
developing a genuinely community-led radical campaign than might otherwise have been the 
case. 
‘Unofficial’ environmental justice movements – often centred not so much on outright 
opposition to development’ as on the contestation of who will actually benefit from a particular 
development strategy – have a long history in Ireland (Allen and Jones 1990). Such campaigns, 
rooted in rural communities, often take time to build a broad consensus and avoid permanent 
breakdowns of interpersonal relations – but once started have an immense capacity for resistance 
and a strong capacity to resist violence and vilification. 
Particularly interesting in this campaign were the prior relationships built between anarchist and 
other urban, class-oriented activists, focussed on issues of social justice and distribution, and 
ecological activists, whose primary concern was preventing environmental destruction. The long 
trust built up between these movements stood the campaign in good stead when it came to both 
recruiting and educating ecological activists from overseas into the importance of economic 
survival for rural communities – and the need to take the lead from community decision-making 
processes. Such activists brought a significant range of practical skills relevant to non-violent 
direct action; website development, media and research; grassroots organising and facilitation 
practices and permaculture. 
 
Environmental justice and community (self-)education 
One fruitful way of tracing the campaign’s developing self-confidence and capacity to constitute 
an effective collective actor is to name the multiple dimensions of self-education that local 
activists went through in the process of the campaign. ‘Shell to Sea started with two campaign 
goals, moving to three in the course of the campaign’s own learning: 
1. Any exploitation of the Corrib gas field be done in a safe way that will not expose the 
local community in Erris to unnecessary health, safety and environmental risks. 
2. To renegotiate the terms of the Great Oil and Gas Giveaway, which sees Ireland’s 10 
billion barrels of oil equivalent off the West Coast go directly to the oil companies, with 
the Irish State retaining a 0% share, no energy security of supply and only 25% tax on 
profits against which all costs can be deducted. 
3. To seek justice for the human rights abuses suffered by Shell to Sea campaigners due to 
their opposition to Shell’s proposed inland refinery. (Shell to Sea, ND) 
 
When translated into campaigning knowledge, these goals involved the development of counter-
expertise around health, safety, environmental and planning issues; radical self-education around 





Eyerman and Jamison (1991), starting from the environmental movement, highlight the extent to 
which social movements involve the development of counter-expertise, the capacity to credibly 
challenge the perspectives presented by official experts. From campaigns against pollution and 
the nuclear industry on, campaigners typically find themselves faced in planning, court and 
media contexts by official expertise co-constituted by the industry, the state, academia and 
journalists and which they have to be able to stand up to if they are to convince others. 
In the case of the pipeline project, the initial counter-expertise required had to do with the 
untested and experimental nature of the pipeline. It involved identifying the health and safety 
risks, in particular to households located close to the pipeline route. Campaigners had to become 
experts on environmental issues, not only those to do with fossil fuels and climate change in 
general, but also those tied to, for example, fisheries in Broadhaven Bay, the SAC designation, 
the history of landslides in particular areas, the relationship between Carrowmore lake and water 
supply for the region, contamination of drinking water. They also had to develop the necessary 
procedural expertise to negotiate the planning and appeals process – to say nothing of the skills 
involved in engaging with the courts, media, politicians, NGOs and so on. 
 
Radical self-education 
The oil industry is extremely complex and operates on a scale far beyond most of our experience 
as everyday social actors. Grasping what it means in practice is no easy task. This can run from 
understanding how few local jobs are actually likely to be created long-term from a pipeline and 
refinery project to uncovering the ways in which the Irish state had dismantled its own royalty 
and tax regime vis-à-vis the oil multinationals.  
So too with the operations of this kind of power politics, whether grounded in the corruption of 
individual politicians or in the state’s ruthless pursuit of what it conceives of as its strategic 
interests. One obvious example has to do with relationships with politicians. Rural and urban 
Irish property-owners, however small, are used to seeking the intervention of county councillors 
and local parliamentary deputies to resolve ‘problems’ ranging from securing planning 
permission for a new house, evicting travellers, seeking roadworks, health provision or 
investment in community projects, and presiding over the opening of sports, school and other 
facilities. It can be a slow and difficult process to realise that the scale of the money involved in 
the oil industry, and the fundamental nature of the interests involved mean that the friendly local 
politician will not be your friend in these contexts. 
There are some parallels here to Alf Nilsen’s (2010) work on the limits of ‘citizenship’ 
knowledge in the Narmada anti-dam campaign in western India: indigenous populations which 
had transformed local power relationships through successfully asserting their legal rights as 
citizens, found that legally-oriented strategies resisting displacement by dam construction were 
ineffective as they challenged the very same interests which had been happy to support the 




Policing and the courts 
Erris is very much the sort of region from which gardaí (Irish police) are recruited. Elderly locals 
normally experience the police (if not always the courts) as their allies against a variety of threats 
and inconveniences, and are rarely exposed to the kind of aggression and intimidation that marks 
police engagements with urban working-class youth, travellers or republicans. The ‘moral shock’ 
of seeing once-trusted police beat, threaten and lie about oneself, one’s family and neighbours is 
not to be underestimated, particularly given the importance of the sense of belonging to a 
‘national community’ excluding such groups. 
It is thus a strong indicator of the learning involved in the campaign that it extended its original 
goals (1 and 2 above) to include an uncompromisingly-phrased demand for ‘justice for human 
rights abuses’ suffered by campaigners. 
 
More generally 
The first part of this chapter questioned simplistic notions of unity and success and restated the 
importance of sustained popular mobilisation, learning through action and alliance formation as 
key elements of the potential needed to bring about a better world. The second part explored 
diverse forms of subaltern knowledge and organisation in this context. Here we can refer in 
particular to Gramsci’s distinction between common sense and good sense; from a community 
education point of view this implies that a confident community, actively constituting its own 
political capacity rather than seeking reliance on an established political broker (in effect the 
negotiation of common sense) is a self-educating agent (Mayo 1999; Ytterstad 2014). 
In the late 1970s and 1980s, rural communities in the southern Irish province of Munster, facing 
greenfield site projects for chemical plants for US multinationals, eventually developed 
sophisticated mechanisms of knowledge transfer, so that the immediate announcement of 
impending development was followed immediately by locals from a neighbouring town able to 
explain in comprehensible and realistic detail what this would mean in practice. 
Something similar developed in Erris: the No Consent project (Anon, n.d.) interviewed local 
activists about what they had learned from the campaign that could be shared with similar 
communities facing the oil and gas industry elsewhere. Turned into a very readable booklet and 
(even more importantly) a portable exhibition of photographs and quotes, this was brought to 
several communities facing fracking in the 2010s, to great effect. Other networking processes 
helped put local activists together with those in similar, disadvantaged rural communities 
encountering fracking, sharing expertise and developing solidarity. 
The state’s retreat, marked by the passing of anti-fracking legislation and the scale of support for 
anti-drilling legislation, is indicative of how effective the Erris community has been – through its 
self-development as an autonomous political actor, its painstaking self-education, and its concern 
for knowledge transfer to related communities elsewhere, sharing what had been learnt from 




Community-based environmental justice despite the professionals 
Paid professionals, in the campaign against Shell, were mostly prominent by their absence – with 
the exception of one or two NGOs, who used the issue to pursue legal cases of their own and 
abandoned the campaign once these had been concluded . This of course parallels the actions of 
party politicians noted earlier. 
A couple of honourable exceptions can be noted. The small and radical development group AfrI 
(Action from Ireland) retained a genuine connection to the campaign throughout. Returned 
development worker Sister Majella McCarron, with a history of involvement in the Ogoni 
campaign against Shell’s operations in the Niger Delta, was a consistent ally. Some of the 
‘outside activists’ involved in the campaign were trained or employed as community workers of 
various kinds, though their actions in Erris were not carried out on this basis. 
There were specific Irish contexts to this. ‘Social partnership’ has already been mentioned: the 
involvement since 1987 of trade unions, farmers and employers in corporatist decision-making, 
extended in the 1990s to include community, environmental and most other social movements – 
or at least their formal and funded manifestations – meant that by 2005 most community groups 
were structured around state funding and involvement in ‘consultation’, in return for abandoning 
direct confrontation with the state and not directly criticising state policies. Similar situations 
obtained for environmental groups, who consistently avoided mentioning the Rossport campaign 
within Ireland. While not identical with the US reliance on private foundation money criticised 
by INCITE! (2007), the net outcome is the same. 
We can also highlight an even longer-standing distinction in Ireland between ‘consensual’ forms 
of community development in rural areas, geared to advancing local claims around the 
distribution of mainstream rewards, and ‘oppositional’ community development – largely in 
urban working-class and traveller contexts (Curtin and Varley 1995). In a ‘consensual’ context, it 
was easy for Shell to distribute small amounts of money to ‘community’ projects and the state to 
remind existing groups of favours owed and salaries still being paid. Such relationships place 
strong limits on what community workers can advance politically. 
In No Consent, some local campaigners did feel in retrospect that some of those they had 
condemned as being ‘bought off’ by Shell money would have been better understood as slow 
learners, who could have been won to the campaign in time and should not have been written off 
entirely. However it has to be said that few if any such individuals managed this learning curve 
from their own side, so these reflections may rather represent common feelings of regret at 
ruptures within small-scale communities. 
Leaving Irish specifics aside, when the state understands its core interests as being at stake – as 
has been the case for the last 100 years when the oil industry is in question, it will always be hard 
for those whose professional position and organisations depend on state funding to seriously 
oppose it. Criminalising movements is particularly effective in detaching this layer of 
professionals. Such professionals as were able to engage as professionals in the area were rather 
a handful of journalists, trade unionists and academics. 
This does not, however, mean that professionals employed by the community rather than by the 
state might not have contributed more strongly to the campaign if such people had existed. One 
line of critique, then, challenges professionals as such and seeks to restore the central role of 
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unpaid local community activists; another asks whether and under what circumstances it might 
be possible for community organisations with their own staff to become independent from state 
and corporate money. 
 
Conclusion 
However none of this means that solidarity and agency are absent. Solidarity was very widely 
expressed both nationally and internationally, in important practical ways. The development of 
popular agency – as opposed to relying on official processes, corporate consultation, elected 
representatives or NGOs and professionals – was central to the actual learning process involved.  
In many ways this represents a return to some of the foundational approaches in community 
development, which are about asserting the development of popular agency rather than the 
insertion of paid professionals as a goal in its own right. This is perhaps particularly significant 
where the issues at stake are such as to pit what the state perceives as its core interests against 
very different perspectives on the part of the community. Rossport stands as one of the key 
reference points of contemporary grassroots community-led campaigning in Ireland today. Its 
lessons and practices ripple outwards and onwards into the development practices of residential, 
cultural and issue based communities. 
Finally, it is worth considering how far we are now within the dying days of the fossil fuel 
industry, with renewables taking the lead in many countries on economic as well as ecological 
grounds, and support for extraction in new and vulnerable areas (tar sands, Arctic exploration, 
fracking) now the prerogative of hard conservative governments such as the UK, US and 
Australia. In this context, environmental justice activism in disadvantaged rural communities 
raises new kinds of issues, of what will constitute a viable future survival strategy in the context 
of peak oil and climate change. 
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